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This paper reviews ethnographies of neuroscience laboratories in the United States and
Europe, organizing them into three main sections: (1) descriptions of the capabilities
and limitations of technologies used in neuroimaging laboratories to map “activity” or
“function” onto structural models of the brain; (2) discussions of the “distributed” or
“extended” mind in neuroscience practice; and (3) the implications of neuroscience
research and the power of brain images outside the laboratory. I will try to show the
importance of ethnographic work in such settings, and place this body of ethnographic
work within its historical framework—such ethnographies largely emerged within the
Decade of the Brain, as announced by former President of the United States George H.
W. Bush in 1990. The main argument is that neuroscience research and the context within
which it is taking place has changed since the 1990’s—specifically with the launch of “big
science” projects such as the Human Brain Project (HBP) in the European Union and the
BRAIN initiative in the United States. There is an opportunity for more research into the
institutional and politico-economic context within which neuroscience research is taking
place, and for continued engagement between the social and biological sciences.
Keywords: ethnography, neuroscience, science and technology studies, human brain project, BRAIN
INTRODUCTION
Thirteen years after the end of the Decade of the Brain
(DoB), another decade of studying the brain has been formally
launched—the Human Brain Project (HBP) in the European
Union, and the Brain Research through Advancing Innovative
Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) initiative in the United States. These
initiatives promise to develop models and simulations of the brain
(animal and/or human) in order to better understand and even-
tually cure illnesses and diseases such as schizophrenia, epilepsy,
and Alzheimer’s. In many ways, the DoB had an impact over how
neuroscience research was to develop, and over understandings of
the role of the brain in the human body—such as brain plasticity,
the ability to explore the relationship between brain chemistry,
structure, and function through imaging and other technologies,
the influence of genetics on understandings of neurological disor-
ders, how drugs can alter the brain, and different understanding
of how visual signals are transmitted and processed.1 It is likely
that the HBP and BRAIN initiatives will also have an impact on
how neuroscience is to develop in the coming decade and what
kinds of knowledges become favored in this “new” landscape.
The DoB also spurred on a number of ethnographies of
neuroscience laboratories in the United States and Europe—much
1“A Decade after the Decade of the Brain”, is a series of interviews with seven
directors of NIH funded research on brain-related issues about the impact of
advances in the neurosciences since the announcement of the Decade of the
Brain, published on February 26, 2010 by the Dana Foundation. Available at:
http://www.dana.org/Cerebrum/Default.aspx?id=39435
of which this paper aims to review. While there have also been
several historical studies of the neurosciences, as well as reviews
of Science and Technology Studies (STS) in general, this review
will specifically focus on ethnographic accounts of neuroscience
practice. But why an ethnography of neuroscience practice in
the first place? Included throughout the paper will be the jus-
tifications given by the authors for why ethnographic research
is well suited to studying the social context and implications of
neuroscience research. The aim here is to show the relevance of
ethnographic fieldwork in understanding (1) the context within
which neuroscience research takes place and the technologies
that make it possible; (2) distributed systems and networks in
science and what these can say about the assumptions driving
neuroscience research; and (3) the implications of neuroscience
research once findings have “left” the laboratory.
These ethnographies have been important to understanding
the work of neuroscientists in their laboratories, but the current
landscape of neuroscience research is changing. The tools used
by researchers, the distribution of data collection and integration
(not only across disciplines and groups of researchers within
laboratories but also across geographical boundaries), and the
contemporary institutional frameworks of research (academic
and non-academic) have changed since the DoB. Nowadays there
are increased pressures placed on researchers in the natural, social
and human sciences on producing knowledge with impact or
translational value. And with neuroscience becoming “big sci-
ence” with the announcement of HBP and BRAIN, more work
can be done to study the processes through which knowledge
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is transformed as it enters, exits and re-enters the laboratory
and how these processes shape and are shaped by institutional
constraints as well as the broader political economy within which
this research is taking place. Ethnographic studies of neuroscience
knowledge can potentially offer insight into the relationship
between the everyday of scientific practice and reasoning on the
one hand and the political and moral economy of science on the
other, as well as encouraging conversation between the social and
biological sciences, as this special issue aims to do.
It is perhaps notable that some of the pioneers of Science and
Technology Studies carried out their fieldwork in neuroscience
laboratories, even if they may not have explicitly been presented
as such. Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar’s “Laboratory Life”
(1987[1979]) was based on fieldwork in the 1970’s at the Salk
Institute, exploring Roger Guillemin’s work on neuroendocrinol-
ogy. While Latour and Woolgar were not specifically interested in
the brain itself in these studies, their attention to objects, artifacts,
and the embodiment of scientific practice would have an influence
over approaches in the social sciences and in the development
of Science and Technology Studies. Lynch (1985) also under-
went fieldwork in a “neurosciences laboratory”—a neuroanatomy
laboratory—between 1975–1977, and began publishing his work
in the mid 1980’s. Lynch (1985) looked at the use of images, dia-
grams, graphs and other “displays” and how these in turn come to
shape the object of research in specific ways, including an analysis
of “shoptalk” or how scientists talk about their research. These
approaches, and their emphasis on how technologies place limits
around how objects come to be understood in scientific practice,
no doubt paved the way for a focus on the role of objects in the
creation, mediation, and communication of scientific knowledge.
The next section will look at how more recent ethnographies and
studies of neuroscience laboratories have discussed the technolo-
gies and objects used and how these come to shape knowledge in
the laboratories.
MAPPING MIND ONTO BRAIN: SCANNING, SELECTING,
COLLECTING, DISTRIBUTING
A couple of years after the seminal contributions of Latour,
Woolgar and Lynch to the field of STS, the DoB was announced by
then-President George H. W. Bush, from 1990–2000 (Bush, 1990).
The first ethnography to take place since the announcement was
Joseph Dumit (2004) fieldwork for his PhD in the History of
Consciousness at the University of California, Santa Cruz that
he completed in 1995. As Dumit says, in the conclusion of his
book Picturing Personhood, “I would like to claim, or propose,
that with brain function imaging, we, in the United States, may
have entered a space of active negotiation of the basic terms of
our categories of the person. . . The use of these images in thinking
about ourselves is in its infancy. We are at stake in this work. How
can we not afford to risk jumping in and studying it?” (Dumit,
2004, p. 185). It is, for Dumit, a concern over the implications
of the DoB and how categories like “person”, “normal”, “mental
health” and others could and would be redefined that spurred on
ethnographic work in laboratories. Although the neurosciences
were not new at the time, announcing neuroscience as a national
project was expected to have an effect over how neuroscience
was to develop, how these developments would change how
people would come to think of and govern themselves, and how
social scientists in turn would come to study and interpret these
developments (Martin, 2000; Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013).
Rather than taking inspiration from the work of Latour,
Woolgar and Lynch, Dumit (2004, p. 11) drew on Appadurai’s
research into the “social life of things” (Appadurai, 1986)—“To
trace the various ways in which experiments were designed with
assumed categories of people, how they were carried out and
interpreted, published in technical and popular literature, and
read and incorporated into further experiments, patients’ lives,
and everyday notions of personhood”. Dumit’s work provides
a comprehensive account and understanding of how Positron
Emission Tomography (PET) images come to be through an
oral history with some of the technology’s founders, as well as
observations of scientists’ work in laboratories and conferences.2
It is a great opportunity to hear how and why these technologies
were developed in the way that they did, especially now, around
40 years after the development of PET technology. Dumit shows
how the selection of research subjects for an experiment was such
an integral part of neuroimaging processes in PET at the time—
so much so that scientists could claim first authorship on a paper
if they found the appropriate subject for a specific experiment.
However, Dumit (2004, pp. 60–61) reminds the readers, it is never
clear “to what extent an individual is representative of a group”,
especially so when the experiments involved small testing groups
due to the costs incurred in running them. Consequentially, def-
initions of the normal, abnormal and pathological are contested
due to these technologies, because it is most often the extremes
(normal or pathological) of each category that are usually sought
after for brain imaging experiments (Dumit, 2004; Abi-Rached
and Rose, 2010).
Dumit also paid specific attention to how the shape of the
scanner itself to a large extent also defines the types of data
collected—each scanner is designed to pick up on different types
of information.3 Dumit showed how the images obtained are
limited in form and content, on the types of technologies used,
the research subjects selected, and contingent on historically
and culturally situated activity. However, he reminds us through
interviews with the PET founders that technologies are used
for a specific purpose, to try to answer very specific questions
and do not claim to “tell all”. Dumit (2004) claims to show
how categories of personhood are “incorporated into further
experiments, patients’ lives, and everyday notions of personhood”
(Dumit, 2004, p. 11). We are taken from the production of
the images to the images’ life outside of the laboratory but
are not shown how these “worlds” intersect and exchange, how
the images transform. Do the traveling images and studies of
2Dumit visited labs at Washington University in St. Louis, Johns Hopkins
University, Brook-Haven National Laboratory, Massachusetts Central Hospi-
tal, University of California, Los Angeles, and the University of California,
Irvine. Dumit also attended the following conferences: Radiological Society
of North America, Society for Neuroscience, Society of Nuclear Medicine, and
the Organization for Human Brain Mapping.
3This concern has been expressed within the framework of the HBP, since the
standardization of data from multiple labs and clinics is necessary to fulfill the
main aim of the project—the integration of data in order to build models and
simulations of animal and human brains.
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brain feed back into how researchers do their work and con-
ceptualize their object of research, and if so how? Morana
Alac’s fieldwork from 2002, and Tobias Rees’s fieldwork in and
around 2005—both discussed in later sections—would address
some of these questions by paying more attention to the use
of the objects in the laboratory alongside an investigation of
how scientists talk about their usefulness, as well as to how
scientists come to speak of themselves as neurological beings
(respectively).
Following Dumit’s precedent, Beaulieu’s (2004) fieldwork in
neuroscience laboratories, completed as part of a PhD in Science
and Technology Studies at the University of Amsterdam in 2000,
has looked at the development of “brain mapping” in the 1970’s
and 80’s and its consolidation in the 1990’s taking into account
the digitization of research and databases and how that has an
effect on how knowledge in the neurosciences has been shaped
(Beaulieu, 2004). Beaulieu (2001, p. 1) also highlights the interest
in localization in neuroscience saying, “in contrast to a focus on
processes of mind in time, brain mapping redirected attention
to patterns of activity located in the space of the brain”. One of
Beaulieu’s arguments is that the DoB had the effect of placing
emphasis on building standard models, or atlases of the brain
(such as the Talairach coordinate system) that could be used in
research—not too dissimilar from the current aims of the HBP
although perhaps more modest in ambition. In the 1990’s, there
was a belief that developments in information technology could
help to build better maps of the human brain because more
information could be stored with the digitization of databases
(Beaulieu, 2001). In the ongoing HBP, it is developments in
computing power (supercomputers) that are envisioned to push
neuroscience forward as more information can be integrated, or
brought together. In both cases, one of the main concerns is
over mapping the “mind” (a category Beaulieu, 2001 argues that
has been revived as an object of study since the development
of imaging technologies) onto the human brain. As Beaulieu
(2001, pp. 2–3) Beaulieu explains, the “biologization of mind
in brain mapping takes the social or the environmental rather
seriously. It renders these as features of a map”. And as she explains
elsewhere, areas of study delegated to the social sciences are now
being explored in the neurosciences (Beaulieu, 2003). Beaulieu,
like Dumit, is concerned over the status and value of the images
produced in the laboratories and how important “processes of
technological development and institutional embedding [are] for
the constitution of these objects” (Beaulieu, 2000, p. 5). Again,
it is a concern over the implications of these images and what
they hold—an epistemological concern with the “objectivity” of
neuroscience knowledge and an ethical concern with regards to
its possible and recorded implications.
In a wry twist on mapping function onto spatial coordinates,
and inspired by Pierre Bourdieu’s work on how the division of
space can reflect and shape a community’s social organization,
Roepstroff (2002) maps the functions of neuroscience work in
the laboratory onto the different floors of a newly built build-
ing in a Georgian neighborhood in central London that they
occupy. He points to how the placement of the laboratory in the
basement mirrors the placement of the kitchen in the basement
in traditional Georgian houses—this is where things are made
(Roepstroff, 2002). Roepstorff mentions that this idea was not
refuted by the “natives”, and mentions the description by the
“native” of how the research subjects and the experimental data
travels through the building from floor to floor—subjects enter-
ing the building, and data going up to the top of the building.
“This ‘logic’ of the place appears, on closer examination, quite
magical. Something (experimental subjects) enters the building,
‘they’ go up, and ‘they’ (the data) exit through the top. This
suggests that the house is described—and can indeed be conceived
of—as a site of transformation where subjects are turned into
data” (Roepstroff, 2002, p. 154). Using this analogy, Roepstroff
(2002, p. 154) argues that “the house may therefore be described
as a black box, where subjects enter at the bottom and objectivity
exits at the top”.
In addition, Roepstroff (2002) outlines the important place
“St. John’s House” holds in the brain mapping community—
one of the most widely used brain mapping software was devel-
oped in this building (or rather by people occupying it). But as
Roepstorff mentions, “not everybody in the brain mapping field
agrees with the particular framework of ‘St. John’s House’ and
there are competing analytical tools, particularly in the US and
Canada, each surrounded by an esoteric circle of followers. Several
researchers located in the exoteric circle relative to ‘St. John’s
House’ complain that the framework is being overtly marketed,
and informal, gossipy stories circulate about how articles made
with alternative analytical frameworks have had problems getting
through a peer-review process” (Roepstroff, 2002, p. 159). In this
and other work, Roepstorff includes vivid descriptions of the
scanning process, how people and data move through the space,
and how the data is then analyzed. What his ethnographic work
does not manage to address, however, is how the data collection
and analysis, which Roepstorff describes as being “black boxed”
is actually negotiated between the scientists in the laboratory and
the computers they work with. These moments of coordination
are explored by Alac and described in a later section.
Roepstorff also draws on Ludwig Fleck’s concept of the
“thought style” as “characterized by common features in the prob-
lems of interest to a thought collective, by the judgment which
the thought collective considers evident, and by the methods
which it applies as a means of cognition” (Fleck, 1978, p. 98
cited in Roepstroff, 2002, p. 158). Indeed, usually each laboratory
develops its own software, depending on which data they need
extracted from the scans. Many different groups of researchers
are formed around the same technology, and this is noticeable
by researchers because “they have their own source of funding
and their own interests” (Dumit, 2004, p. 56). In this sense,
“software permits the user to look only at what neuroscientists call
“regional interest” rather than allowing him/her to inspect images
of the whole brain” (Alacˇ, 2006, pp. 152–153). Collection of data
is always attributed to the scanner, rather than to people, and
is regarded as a “black-boxed” procedure. Indeed, even authors
on a paper will many times not be able to answer questions
about how data was collected, or what scanning software was
used, as neuroscience itself is such a distributed science, reliant
on so many different fields of expertise with many people con-
tributing to the knowledge needed to produce a scientific paper
that can be published in a reputable journal (Dumit, 2004).
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This is why scientific institutional processes have been so often
studied as distributed systems.4 It becomes difficult to bound
attribution to a single body, especially as the boundaries between
mind, body and world become ever harder to place and since
collective activity involves so many external artifacts. This is the
spirit behind discussions of collective agencies, and many of the
observations made in science and technology studies—that it is
not quite possible to “trace” origins for an action back to a single
originator if actions are always entangled. Indeed, the HBP sees
this distribution of knowledge as a hindrance to the development
of knowledge within the neurosciences, saying:
We find that the major obstacle that hinders our understanding
the brain is the fragmentation of brain research and the data it
produces. Modern neuroscience has been enormously productive
but unsystematic. The data it produces describes different levels of
biological organization, in different areas of the brain in different
species, at different stages of development. Today we urgently need
to integrate this data—to show how the parts fit together in a
single multi-level system (Human Brain Project: A Report to the
European Commission, 2012, p. 3).
The distribution of knowledge and cognition is a strategy
within scientific work in order to collect the necessary amount
and kinds of data. But this distribution also has an unintended
consequence—knowledge becomes distributed across geography,
and the effects of unstandardized technologies make it difficult to
“fit together” all the work being done in the expanding field of
neuroscience. The next section will explore how this distribution
of action within laboratories has been understood in ethno-
graphic studies of neuroscience laboratories.
LEARNING TO SEE: VISION AND THE
EXTENDED/DISTRIBUTED MIND
It is thus perfectly possible that certain psychological phenom-
ena cannot be investigated physiologically, because physiologically
nothing corresponds to them (Ludwig Wittgenstein 1967, cited in
Martin, 2010, p. 366).
The argument made by the authors that appear later in this
section is that while brain imagers work with certain assumptions,
namely that the “mind” and “cognition” can be mapped onto a
simulated model of the brain and matched to specific locations or
coordinates, the neuroscientists’ work in the laboratory suggests
that the researchers’ environment contributes to this “cognitive”
process—even if not explicitly accounted for in their descriptions
of the research process. The authors pay attention to the distribu-
tion of work across people and artifacts, and to the interaction
between bodies and their external environment. In doing so,
these studies show how ethnographic work in laboratories can
unsettle some of the assumptions driving neuroscience research,
in particular the search for the mind only within the boundaries
of the human brain.
4The work of Knorr-Cetina (1999), Latour and Woolgar (1987[1979]), Lynch
(1985), amongst others have all discussed science as a process distributed
across people and objects.
Based on 9 months of fieldwork at three neuroscience lab-
oratories at the University of California in San Diego and the
Salk Institute studying the neural correlates of vision, Morana
Alac pays attention to the objects in circulation during a “cog-
nitive” task, as well as the types of sensory-motor information
managed by the individuals involved (vision, gesture, touch,
posture). Hutchins (1995, p. xiv) (Alac’s PhD supervisor) ideas
on “distributed cognition” were born out of long-term fieldwork
aboard U.S. Navy ships, where his aim was to understand “how
people go about knowing what they know and the contribution
of the environments in which the knowing is accomplished”.
The title of the book, “Cognition in the Wild’ refers to “the
distinction between the laboratory, where cognition is studied
in captivity, and the everyday world, where human cognition
adapts to its natural surroundings”. This refers to the problem
of laboratory work, and the problem of generalizing findings to
human behavior outside of it.
Drawing on Hutchin’s work, Alacˇ (2006, p. 10) says studying
cognition in social settings (rather than as a process internal
to the individual) offers many advantages; “a study of cognitive
processes of a single individual does not always allow one to
predict the properties of the system. A distributed cognitive
system may have emergent characteristics that are generated by
interactions among properties that are not present in any indi-
vidual element of the system”. The distributed action, along with
the visualization of the scanner’s data, allow scientists to make
sense of the large amount of data retrieved from the scanners
and provides a way for scientists to discuss the abstract data in
concrete ways. It is not just that action or cognition is already
distributed, but scientists intentionally distribute cognition across
multiple platforms (human and non-human) in order to solve the
problem of wanting to see inside the human brain. Alac draws
on Edwin Hutchin’s theory of “distributed cognition” to explain
how Octavia, a scientist in the laboratory, uses a chart that she
developed and drew by hand to see and teach other people to see
cognitive processes in brain images—specifically the distribution
of activity over time, and the motion of activity across the mapped
brain. Octavia uses the chart and her hands to gesture and to point
at the screen, explaining to the “novice” that “it takes quite a bit
of training to start and actually see” (Alacˇ and Hutchins, 2004;
Alacˇ, 2006, p. 118).
The meaning of these brain images, although reliant on sci-
entific knowledge (as communicated through the charts prepared
by the “expert”), also require technical skill and a social setting
for that meaning to be made. This marks a break between the
types of knowledge scientists gain in formalized education, and
that gained “in practice”, as other anthropologists have observed
in medical practice.5 We also see how important the represen-
tational material (for example, the chart made by the expert)
is to the entire process of knowledge production. Making sense
of the breadth of data represented in these images requires the
mobilization of “cognitive artifacts” as Hutchins (1999) calls
them—objects that help people perform cognitive tasks such as
5For example, Tom Rice (2010, p. 44) has conducted ethnographic fieldwork
in St. Thomas’s Hospital in London to study how stethoscopic listening is
taught as an “apprenticeship in hearing”.
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understanding. Alac shows how this process is one of “distributed
cognition”, whereby the end product, which is an understanding
of what the brain images show, is gained through interactions
with objects (the computer, the chart) and people. But it is also
such an embodied practice, that it requires an “expert” to teach
the “novice”, rather than the “novice” being able to learn through
representational material alone.
In a related manner, Andreas Roepstorff discusses the concept
of “skilled vision”, and how seeing certain things in brain images
require skills that are learned in a specific social context. At the
laboratory where Roepstorff works, they have invited a “mas-
ter” neuropsychologist to look at some of their experimental
data. To test his knowledge, they give him a couple of images
and ask him to figure out what the experiments were with
no prior knowledge of the set-up. By looking at the areas of
activation as shown in the images, the neuropsychologist is
able to tell what the scientists at the laboratory were testing
for in their experiments. Roepstorff uses this example to show
how the “master” neuropsychologist could not only interpret
brain images “on the fly”, but also is able to place them in a
narrative and begin to explain the relationship between both
images and what the data “means”. While Roepstorff does not
look at the artifacts used to aid cognition and their role in
distributed cognition as Alac does, he is paying attention to the
social context that comes into play when “learning how to see”.
Roepstorff concludes that rather than using vision in order to
know things, in neuroscience laboratories one needs to know in
order to see. The neuropsychologist’s ability to locate significant
data on the maps/brain images points to how brain images
contain within them a limited number of ways the data can be
interpreted, and one’s knowledge of the markers reinforces one’s
belonging to a brain imaging community. Seeing, especially in
laboratories, is usually thought of as sensory in nature rather
than social. And the assumption that seeing is knowing, argues
Roepstorff, lies behind how powerful brain images are in their
ability to provide a window into the human brain. By arguing
that seeing requires knowledge about an issue means that “seeing”
requires a social context within which sight can be formed or
taught.
“Cognitive processes ain’t (all) in the head!” say Clark and
Chalmers (1998) Chalmers in an article titled “The Extended
Mind”. Their argument is that in certain situations, “the human
organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interac-
tion, creating a coupled system that. . .counts equally well as a cog-
nitive process, whether or not it is wholly in the head” (Clark and
Chalmers, 1998, p. 9). Research by Nicolas Langlitz into the use
and experience of the effects of psychedelics (lysergic acid diethy-
lamide (LSD) and psilocybin) in laboratories in Switzerland,
Germany and the United States has shown how important the
setting or context is to how an individual reacts to the influence
of the drugs ingested. Langlitz mentions how no pharmaceutical
company is interested in psychedelics, for example, because there
is no way of controlling how a person is to react—it is dependent
on so many things within the individual and outside of him/her.
Pharmaceutical companies want to find drugs that work the same
on everyone, which targets a very specific location in the brain.
What Langlitz is saying is that the mind cannot be reduced to the
brain alone, given how important surroundings are to individuals’
experiences and cognitive behavior and to how unpredictable the
social context will be at a given time, referring to the “extended
mind hypothesis” (Langlitz, 2013).
In a similar vein, Simon Cohn (2008, p. 90) argues that, “what
finally appears as an area of activation in the final brain scan of
a volunteer is actually the combined response of the person in
the scanner, the physical provisions of the experiment, and the
thinking of the scientist who not only has to prime the volunteer,
but who also establishes an essential level of intimacy with him
or her in order for the experiment to be conducted in the first
place”. Adding to the discussions by Alac, Beaulieu, and Dumit
who show how the interactions with technologies and artifacts
shape the ways in which interpretations are made in laboratories,
Cohn is showing how the interactions between the scientists
running the experiments and the volunteers create a certain
environment, or “level of intimacy” that shapes the environment
within which the experiments are performed. If the “mind” is
inseparable from body and world, the human (and non-human)
environments within which cognition take place are as essential
to understandings of how the body works. Ethnographic research
can unsettle findings of neuroscience research because it is able
to pay attention to interactions between bodies, artifacts, and
their environments. As Alacˇ (2011, p. 162) says, her work in the
laboratories “has moved to unpack two theoretical assumptions
that have dominated the examined historical period in cognitive
neuroscience: the idea that human cognition is internal, and the
assumption that embodiment concerns a single person and, in
particular, her or his brain processes”. But if cognition and the
“mind” are distributed and extended, how far are they extended
and how much of a person’s environment can be included? The
next section will look at the importance of looking into the
institutional framework within which neuroscience research takes
place, as part of the environment involved in the thinking of
researchers in neuroscience.
HOW FAR OUT OF THE LAB: THE LINKS BETWEEN RESEARCH
PRODUCTION AND THE MANAGEMENT OF RESEARCH
In the last two chapters of “Picturing Personhood”, Dumit (2004)
moves his gaze from what is taking place within the lab to
looking for where the brain images “travel” to once they have
left the laboratory. These chapters do not rely on ethnographic
observation, and instead look to the implications of using brain
images in courtrooms and how images are presented to the media
using historic case studies and representations in popular media
such as film. While providing a useful overview of the controversy
of showing medical images in courtrooms, future ethnographic
accounts of the presentation and interpretation of these images in
court could offer more insight into how the meaning is negotiated
within this context between the “experts”, legal staff, and jury—
that is if an ethnographer could gain access to such settings.
Similar to how Cohn (2010) speaks to the subjects of neuroscience
experiments in order to understand their own perceptions and
interpretations of their brain scans, interviews and fieldwork in
courtroom cases that use brain images as “evidence” can show the
disjuncture between “expert” and “popularized” interpretations
over the meaning of these images as well as the negotiation over
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the implications of such medical knowledge and how these will
come into play in judging a person’s culpability.
Another important part in how images leave the laboratory is
in the publication and peer review process. Alacˇ (2004) describes
the process of submitting, reviewing and publishing an article
in the journal Science. The authors of the article are researchers
in the same laboratories Alac conducted her research in. These
researchers have developed their own software, which inflates
and flattens cortical maps. While the software is becoming more
commonly used in visual cortex mapping, Alac shows how dif-
ferent and novel ways of representing data have to be negotiated
with their peers throughout the review process. Alacˇ (2004, pp.
201–202) argues that “the meaning of the text, and especially
the results of the study, are in a significant manner produced
through the brain images reproduced in the article” in the form
of comments and amendments to how the data is presented and
in how “each single image acquires its meaning by referring to
the other images that are part of the figure”. This is reminiscent
of Anne Beaulieu’s (2004) comment that the individual brain
image becomes valuable in relation to the other images in the
datasets. Alac shows that the experimental methods adopted by
the scientists are met with resistance from the reviewers, who
are requesting for the data to be visualized in more familiar,
conventional ways so that they are more accessible and easily
understood. This negotiation, taking place through the images
(comments about and amendments to), is not about the esthetics
of the image, but about the criteria, or parameters, underlying the
ways in which the images have come to be. Paying attention to the
negotiation between the reviewers and the researchers shows how
important moments of coordination are in understanding how
information changes as it exits and re-enters the laboratory.
In a more explicit focus on the political economy of neurosci-
entific research, Langlitz’s fieldwork in a human lab in Switzerland
and an animal lab in California (both working on the effects of
psychedelics such as LSD and psilocybin) shows how powerful
national policies and legal frameworks can be in deciding what
areas are deemed valid for scientific inquiry over others. For
example, research with psychedelics on humans has not been
possible outside Switzerland because of the drug regulation laws
and policies in the US banning the use of illegal drugs in research.
Langlitz shows how the hype around neuroscience research fol-
lowing the DoB allowed for a “revival of hallucinogen research”
in Europe. This comparative and multi-sited examination of
the institutional constraints and the broader political economy
in Switzerland, Germany and the United States—national and
international drug regulations, pharmaceutical markets, institu-
tional and ethical review boards, and the hospitals housing the
laboratories—is especially important within the framework of
the newly launched HBP since every country within the EU has
different laws and policies regulation research practice and uses of
data.
These ethnographies show how the institutional settings of
neuroscience, and the complex web of networks and actors this
invokes, play into the development of “cognitive artifacts” (the
tools favored and used in neuroscience research), in defining
researcher interests and priorities, and in defining what is to be
considered “noise” versus valid and usable data (what is included
in the datasets being developed in laboratories). Indeed, looking
for “zones of interest”—what is important to look at—inevitably
excludes other “zones”. However, and like any empirical discipline
(including ethnography), there is always a need to define the
variables and limit the amount of information collected and
analyzed—to “reduce noise”. This is not an attack on the validity
of neuroscience findings since this is arguably shared across all
disciplines, but is rather an opportunity to explore how contem-
porary concerns become embedded into the accumulation and
interpretation of research findings. Concern is expressed over
how findings in neuroscience are generalized from the individual
(also many times animal) to the collective human (Rose and Abi-
Rached, 2013), and this is especially problematic when consid-
ering the pressure researchers are under to show the usefulness
of their research in order to maintain funding. Although this is
not a problem specific to the neurosciences, this limitation has
been readily acknowledged by neuroscientists as is indicated in the
following quote: “we know we need hype to sell our research; let’s
try to keep it out of the results!” (Louis Sokoloff cited in Dumit,
2004, p. 53). These “translational” issues (Rose and Abi-Rached,
2013) of how information is mediated in its traverse from idea
to experiment to publication, presentation, etc., can be further
studied ethnographically.
For example, Rayna Rapp’s work explores the translational
research imperative (from bench to bedside) that has become a
condition for funding in the US, and how this affects the hype
of medical research, how the media represents the findings of
research and how people in turn come to understand and define
who they are. Rapp (2011b) follows the “laboratory labors of
two scientific groups: neuroscientists who scan children’s brains
in search of resting state differences according to diagnosis and
psychiatric epidemiologists who look to epigenetics to distinguish
differential diagnostic populations” Rapp (2011b, p. 662). Rapp
shows how powerful medicalized understandings of learning dif-
ficulties are in how parents and their children come to under-
stand differences in development and children’s behavior, and
in turn to how researchers understand and develop their own
work. Rapp warns against the dangers of hyped research and the
hopes it embodies, and reminds readers of the changing trends
in research—that these understandings of the mind and how it
works shall pass and change, as the institutions that support (and
are supported by) research change.
In a similar vein (although not explicitly mentioning issues of
translation), Tobias Rees investigates the relationship between life
and science in the laboratory of Alain Prochiantz in Paris, France.
Rees (2010) in concerned with how plasticity, as a technological
and conceptual development in the history of the neurosciences,
has become an ethical concern: “human beings cease to be fixed
and immutable machines, cease to be already wired information-
processing computers of sorts” (Rees, 2010, p. 157). Rees shows
how scientists in the laboratory he studies come to define them-
selves as neurological beings, using the same terms they use to
understand their object of research, and how powerful these
concepts (such as plasticity) become in how the relationship
between life and science become in answering what Rees defines
as some of the key questions in ethics: “What shall we do? How
shall we live?” (Rees, 2010, p. 159).
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Over a decade after the DoB, there is a similar promissory tone
to the announcements of the HBP in the EU and the BRAIN
project in the US. The brain is presented as the last frontier in
human science—the last piece in the puzzle to understand how
the human body works together—and justifications for undertak-
ing such expensive and expansive research projects typically refer
to the impact of “disorders of the brain”. The Proclamation, made
in 1990 by former President George W. Bush states:
Over the years, our understanding of the brain—how it works,
what goes wrong when it is injured or diseased—has increased
dramatically. However, we still have much more to learn. The
need for continued study of the brain is compelling: millions of
Americans are affected each year by disorders of the brain rang-
ing from neurogenetic diseases to degenerative disorders such as
Alzheimer’s, as well as stroke, schizophrenia, autism, and impair-
ments of speech, language, and hearing.
Thirteen years after, the justifications of the HBP are not so
different:
These technologies can enormously accelerate brain research.
They can also open the road to treatments that prevent and cure
brain disease and to new computing technologies with the poten-
tial to revolutionize industry, the economy and society. Medical
informatics can mine enormous volumes of clinical data allowing
us to understand the basis causes of brain diseases, a pre-condition
for early diagnosis, prevention and cure. . . If European industry is
to play a leading role in the world economy of the 2020s and 2030s,
it has to take the lead in developing these technologies (Human
Brain Project: A Report to the European Commission, 2012, p. 8).
This statement refers not just to the importance of finding
better cures for “brain diseases” but also the important economic
role that the HBP would play in developing European industry.
In response, perhaps, the US launched the BRAIN Initiative and
although different in scope and approach, in a section on the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) website dedicated to the
BRAIN Initiative, there is a link on the left of the screen titled,
“Why is this needed?” that states:
With nearly 100 billion neurons and 100 trillion connections, the
human brain remains one of the greatest mysteries in science
and one of the greatest challenges in medicine. Neurological
and psychiatric disorders, such as Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s
disease, autism, epilepsy, schizophrenia, depression, and traumatic
brain injury, exact a tremendous toll on individuals, families,
and society. . .If we are ever to develop effective ways of helping
people suffering from these devastating conditions, researchers
will first need a more complete arsenal of tools and information for
understanding how the brain functions both in health and disease
(National Institutes of Health, 2013).
Again, justifications for the research bring up how
developments in modeling the brain can help better understand
how the brain works and in turn how this can help understand
“neurological and psychiatric disorders”. As Rose (2013)
mentions, “the belief in the implications of advances in the life
sciences for our everyday lives is exacerbated by the “translational
imperative”—the obligation on researchers in biology and
biomedicine to promise to funders, to research assessors, to
their university press offices and to the media that the results
of their work on the fly, the worm, the mouse or the macaque
will soon reach the clinic—usually “in 3–5 years” (Rose, 2013,
p. 7). This pushes researchers to think not only of the process of
producing knowledge, but also of how that knowledge can or will
be managed and used once it has been published.
There is an “oscillation between the condition of knowing
through investigation (research) and the condition of asking what
is to be done with that knowledge (management)” (Strathern,
2006)—such as the links between the process of producing neu-
roscience knowledge (Roepstorff, 2001; Alacˇ, 2004, 2005, 2006,
2008, 2011; Alacˇ and Hutchins, 2004; Beaulieu, 2004), and how
neuroscience data is used in court rooms, for example (Dumit,
2004). At a time when funding is becoming evermore depen-
dent on researchers showing how impactful their research is,
an investigation into the institutional mechanisms supporting
(and being supported by) scientific research (ethical review pro-
cesses, national funding bodies, government agencies, universi-
ties, researchers, students, etc.) can provide valuable insight into
how the boundaries between research and management are made
and crossed. As Strathern (2006, p. 194) notes, “the researcher
turns into a manager. . .when boundaries of expertise are crossed
and research has to be presented to those who do not share that
‘everything else”’. What are the implications of this crossing of
boundaries, from research production to research management?
And how do these two processes affect and relate to one another?
How do considerations and ideas about how the management of
research is to be done come into play during the research process
itself, in deciding what words to use in funding proposals, devel-
oping the tools and technologies used in research (the “cognitive
artifacts”), and in how researchers “think” of their projects, as is
encouraged by funding bodies? Further ethnographic work in the
spaces branching out of and into the neuroscience laboratory can
maybe help to answer some of these questions.
CONCLUSION
From time to time, new forms emerge that have something sig-
nificant about them, something that catalyzes previously present
actors, things, institutions into a new mode of existence, a new
assemblage, an assemblage that makes things work in a different
manner (Paul Rabinow 2000, cited in Rapp, 2011a, p. 663).
It is a unique opportunity to be able to watch how ethno-
graphic work will develop alongside the developments in neu-
roscience within the frameworks of the HBP and BRAIN. While
the focus has been mainly on brain imaging in these ethno-
graphies, neuroscience has been developing other “non-invasive”
tools such as Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), and has
been developing methods in computational neuroscience that
are likely to change the objects and artifacts that comprise the
“extended mind” of the researchers in laboratories. For example,
the Talairach atlas became a convention in neuroscience in the
1990’s—how will the models and simulations developed as part
of the HBP change and shape the way neuroscience research is
performed? In addition, the majority of these ethnographies have
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taken place in laboratories in the US and the UK, but these two
countries are marginal actors in the HBP—Switzerland, Spain,
France, and other countries will be the main sites of laboratory
research. There will be an increased need to understand the
distribution of action and research across geographical bound-
aries, as well as disciplinary.
As is rightly noted by Rose (2013, pp. 23–24), there is a
need to “move beyond description, commentary and critique,
beyond the study of downstream ‘implications’ of biology and
biomedicine, to develop an affirmative relation to the new ways
of understanding the dynamic relations between the vital and
its milieu. . . one that seeks to identify and work with those
arguments that recognize, in whatever small way, the need for
a new and non-reductionist biology of human beings and other
organisms in their milieu, and which can thus be brought into
conversation with the evidence, concepts and forms of analysis
developed in the social and human sciences”. There are several
initiatives underway that try to bridge the human, social and
biological sciences within the context of neuroscience research.
Roepstorff (2012), now working alongside neuroscientists,
looks for ways in which the methods of anthropology can be
of aid/use to neuroscience but also how knowledge from both
disciplines can cross over. One such approach is the work of
Robert Turner, the son of anthropologist Victor Turner, who
had an important role in developing fMRI technology into
what it is today. Holding a postgraduate degree in anthropol-
ogy from University College London (UCL), Turner has writ-
ten about brain plasticity. In an article titled, “How Collective
Representations Can Change the Structure of the Brain’, Turner
and Whitehead (2008, p. 43) “present recent imaging research
which. . .demonstrates that collective representations can have
well-defined cortical representations”. But like Rose and Abi-
Rached (2013, pp. 141–163), the authors claim that arguments
that there is a part of the brain that is responsible for the “social”
side of human behavior is rather simplistic and does not even
correspond to neuroscientific data. Turner and Whitehead (2008,
pp. 47, 51) accept that even the production of neuroscientific
knowledge itself takes place within a social context, saying that
and referencing Roepstorff, “in order for the subject to feel com-
fortable enough in the unfamiliar, confined and very noisy space
of the scanner bore, they must be put at ease and reassured by the
radiographer, using well-rehearsed social skills. This has aspects
of an initiation, a rite of passage”. But they do argue that collective
representations6 like language do have a cortical basis, saying that
much research suggests that repeated activity if done over enough
of a period of time, will increase the size of the area in the cortex
that was associated with the activity from the first scan, showing
that “our brains are reorganized by repetitive motor practice”.
This is an opportunity to explore the correspondence between
repeated embodied motion, as takes place in the laboratories
when “experts” teach “novices” how to read the brain images
for example, and attempts by neuroscientists to find the neural
6Borrowing Durkheim’s term and defined in the text as “components of
human life that have meaningful existence only because we agree that they do
— such as customs, money, religion, cosmology, language, games, laws, power
structures and artistic genres” (2008, p. 43).
correlates of specific activities in the brain. Such an approach,
however, “mainly concerned with identifying links between struc-
tures in minds and structures in the world” (Roepstorff and Frith,
2012, p. 108), runs the risk of essentializing the social and “may
be unable to capture humans as persons” which would separate
such an approach from anthropological concerns (Roepstorff and
Frith, 2012, p. 108).
But Roepstorff (2012, p. 108) says that what is more important
than a hybrid discipline joining anthropology and neuroscience,
is the “need to develop a metalevel discourse that can grasp what
happens when experiments and concepts travel”. This can, no
doubt, be interpreted in several ways, but an attempt at under-
standing the crossing of boundaries in how research findings
are made, how they are presented, and how the implications of
research define and re-define human ways of thinking of or doing
things may contribute to this project. The Critical Neuroscience
initiative which aims to increase collaboration between neurosci-
entists and social scientists on specific issues and study the social
context and implications of neuroscience research (as the title of
this special issue suggests); Steven Woolgar and Tanja Schneider’s
3 year research project on the development and implications of
neuromarketing; Felicity Callard and Daniel Marguiles’s work on
the resting brain; the Foresight and Responsible Research Innova-
tion Lab (FRRIL) studying the implications of the HBP headed by
Nikolas Rose; amongst others, can offer some insight into “what
happens when experiments and concepts travel” (Roepstorff and
Frith, 2012, p. 108).
Rose’s call to “work with these researchers. . .and guard against
the rush to demand immediate impacts in social policies and
practices” warns against rehashing critiques of the neurosciences
without creating a productive communication between the disci-
plines (Rose, 2013, p. 19). Observing the ways in which concepts
and theories are embedded in objects that travel into and out
of the laboratory, understanding the institutional context and
constraints that allow objects to develop in specific ways, and
how these in turn come to be used by scientists in thinking
through understandings of their object of study may help to create
an awareness and understanding of the links between research
practice and the promotion of research that can be useful in other
impactful disciplines beyond the neurosciences.
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